I. To the Question

A. Two Extreme Opinions

1. First Opinion

a. Exposition of the Opinion

115. There are here two extreme opinions.

One that posits only quantity to be, and to be able to be, in the Eucharist without a subject [Giles of Rome, Thomas Aquinas].

116. For this opinion there are four reasons.

The first is as follows: only quantity is individuated per se, and all other accidents are individuated through quantity; therefore, if there were some accident and it were not in quantity, it would be a ‘this’ and would not be a ‘this’.

117. Again [nn.117-119 are from Giles or Rome], if whiteness were separated from quantity, it would be perceptible and imperceptible. The proof that it would be perceptible is that it would be per se in the third species of quality [Aristotle, Categories 8.9a28-10a10]. The proof that it would be imperceptible is that a non-quantum cannot be sensed. If this be denied it is proved as follows, that according to the Philosopher, De Sensu et Sensato 6.445b3-11 about a certain matter of doubt: “if what is perceptible were divided infinitely, the sense power would be divided infinitely.” This consequence is only valid if the sense power has to increase according to the decrease of the perceptible thing; if then some perceptible thing is disproportionately less, the senses would have to increase disproportionately; but an indivisible perceptible thing is disproportionately less (so to speak) than any perceptible quantum;     therefore some sense power will be able to be disproportionately greater than any other. The consequent is false; therefore etc     .

118. Again, if whiteness were without quantity, it would be a spiritual quality because it would be indivisible; and it would be a bodily quality because it is in the third species of quality; and so it would be spiritual and non-spiritual.

119. Again, if it were without quantity and so spiritual, there would be no repugnance to its being in a spirit, and so a spirit could be white.

b. Rejection of the Opinion

α. Against the Reasons for the Opinion

120. These reasons are not proofs.

The first [n.116] is not, because an accident is not a singular formally by something of another genus; for just as it is possible to find, in any genus, a supreme in the joint ordering of the genus and possible to find all the intermediate genera and species, so it is possible to find in that joint ordering something lowest per se of which they are all predicated and it not predicated of any;The ordering here is clearly one of predication, where the most universal term is predicated ultimately of the individual singular. So sense quality is most universal, color is less universal, red is less universal still, this individual red is least universal, and all the others are ultimately predicated of this individual red. So, individuation in color must be in the genus of color and not derived from individuation in something else, as say from the individual red being the color of this individual extension or quantity. ⁴⁰ therefore a quality, even when it is in a quantity, is not a ‘this’ formally through quantity; therefore if there is a cause, even a proximate but extrinsic one, of the singularity of the quality, the quality can be a singular without that extrinsic cause. More is contained about this in Ord. II d.3 nn.89-92.

121. Again the second reason [n.117], about perceptible and imperceptible, is not conclusive. For ‘perceptible’ can be said to be either what is in remote potency or what in proximate potency to being sensed. In remote potency there is whatever has a sufficient form but not under the fitting mode under which it must be had in order to be sensed; in proximate potency there is what has the form such that act could, when the impediment ceases, follow at once. This distinction is made clear in Ord. I d.7 n.32, and is proved there by the Philosopher in Metaphysics 5 and 9 [ibid. n.33]. It is plain also from Anselm On Freedom of Choice ch.4, where Anselm holds that we have in us no potency that suffices by itself for act (as he exemplifies about sight, which is not sufficient for an act of seeing without an object and an illumined medium etc.).

122. A separate whiteness would be perceptible in this way, by taking ‘perceptible’ for remote potency; because whiteness would be a form that was in itself an activator of sight, though not under this mode of being; and for this reason it would not be perceptible in the sense of proximate potency. Nor is there any contradiction because of this, just as neither would there be if you argued about divisible and indivisible. For the whiteness is divisible by remote possibility because it could be in a quantum, and then it would be in proximate potency to being divided; but it would not be divisible in proximate potency as long as it was without quantity.

123. And when you argue [n.117] that if the whiteness were perceptible then the sense [of sight] would disproportionately exceed every other sense - I say that the consequence does not hold unless the whiteness were perceptible to some sense in proximate potency; for then that sense would be more perfect than every other sense in the proportion in which the sensible object would depart from the other sensibles. But though I concede that it is perceptible in remote potency, yet I do not concede that it is perceptible to any sense in proximate potency; and so there is no need that some sense be able to perceive or know the whiteness under this mode of existing, nor consequently that it disproportionately exceeds the other senses; for this would only follow if the sensible object were in proximate potency, for thus does the Philosopher argue there [n.117] about every sensible object.

124. To the third [n.118] I say that whiteness would be simply a bodily quality or bodily whiteness, because directed simply to perfecting body; but it would be non-bodily in a certain respect because not bodily actually - just as a bodily substance would, though it were without quantity, still be bodily, because it would be naturally fitted to be under quantity (but an angel would not be thus fitted); and it would also be indivisible actually, but divisible in remote potency or aptitude, as was said [n.122].

125. As to the fourth argument [n.119]: it is thoroughly lacking in any plausible appearance, because just as a stone cannot be wise, for the reason that it in no way has the idea of being receptive in respect of wisdom, so an angel cannot be white, for the reason that an angel is in no way capable of taking up that form (whether the form were posited to be divisible or indivisible). Now indeed there is a double reason that an angel cannot be white: one is extension in the form and lack of extension in an angel; the other reason is that this form is this form, and an angel is an angel. And the second reason is the essential idea of the impossibility, the first reason is not; ‘therefore when the first is taken away, there is a possibility’ is a null consequence.The first reason (extension in the form of whiteness and non-extension in an angel) is based on a property of whiteness and angel. The second reason (this form is this form, an angel is an angel) is based on the essence of whiteness and angel (whiteness/color is the limit of the transparent in the surface of a body, an angel is a non-bodily substance). So even if the first reason were taken away, the second would remain and be sufficient by itself to prove the relevant impossibility; and thus denial of the second would not follow denial or dismissal of the first (contrary to what the initial argument supposed [n.119]). ⁴¹

β. Against the Conclusion of the Opinion

126. There is argument against this first reason [n.115] as to its conclusion as well:

First as follows: dependence on a first is more essential than dependence on anything posterior to it, speaking of absolute dependents and of absolutes on which there is dependence; but quality is an absolute form just as is quantity;     therefore quality more essentially depends on substance than on quantity. So if a quality can be without actual dependence on a substance, it will be able to be without actual dependence on quantity.

127. Again, existing per se is not more repugnant to an absolute and a more perfect absolute than to a more imperfect absolute; quality is an absolute form, and (according to them [Giles of Rome]) more perfect than quantity; therefore etc     .

128. Proof of the minor as to its second part [sc. quality is more perfect than quantity]:

First, because quality is a per se principle of acting with a real action - the point is plain and they themselves concede it; quantity is not, because no real action, as we are now speaking of it, belongs to quantity.

129. Second, because the order of qualities is considered according to the order of substances, for to more noble substances correspond more noble qualities. But the order of quantities does not so correspond, for a more noble substance is not always greater in quantity (for the largest bodies in the genus of corruptible things, of which sort are the elements, are the most imperfect). Now that seems more perfect which corresponds proportionally in its perfection to what is simply more perfect.

130. Third, because substances more perfectly attain their ends through qualities; for either the beatific act is a quality (which was touched on in Ord. I d.3 n.505), or if it is not, at least according to common opinion some supernatural qualities are required for beatitude, or some form that is a quality is [cf. Rep. IVA d.49 q.10]. But quantity is in no way a principle for substance of attaining its end.

131. Fourth, because quantity follows the composite by reason of matter, but quality follows it by reason of form; but form is simply more perfect than matter,

Metaphysics 7.3.1029a5-6. And this last point is perhaps the reason of the first, second, and third middle terms [sc. in the arguments in nn.128-130] for, on this account, the order of qualities corresponds in perfection to the order of substances [n.129], and for this reason quality is the principle of real action [n.128], and also the principle for substance itself of attaining its end [n.130].

132. Fifth, because what agrees more with perfection simply is simply more perfect; but some quality, as wisdom for example, agrees more with perfection simply (and likewise do understanding and willing) than any quantity, either because the one is the formal idea of divine wisdom and created wisdom, which is a quality (according to one opinion, touched on in Ord. I d.8 nn.3, 90-94), or if it is not, at least as to all nearness and analogy the nearness of created wisdom to divine wisdom is greater than that of any quantity to God or to anything of God. Hence just as it is possible for perfection simply to exist in a creature, namely with a limitation, the quality that is wisdom is a perfection simply of him who has it; but no quantity is a perfection simply, not even in the way it is possible for a creature to have perfection simply.

133. Against this reason [n.127] an objection is made as follows: what is closer to what is more perfect is simply more perfect; quantity is closer to substance than quality is; but substance is the most perfect of all beings; therefore quantity is more perfect than quality.

134. I reply: if many perfections (in what way ‘many’ I care not now) come together at once in the first perfect thing, perhaps something can be nearer to it according to one perfection and not according to another. For example:

135. God is a simply necessary existence, and this necessity in him is a perfection simply; the more necessary a thing is, therefore, the closer it is to God, and in this way the heaven is closer to God than is anything corruptible.

136. But besides this, God is a simply perfect intellectual nature; in this respect a merely intellectual creature, though finite, is closer to God, of which sort is the angelic nature; after this comes intellectual nature, but not merely intellectual, and, along with this, finite; after this comes sense nature, which more approaches intellectual nature than non-sense nature does. In this order, then, a fly is closer to God than the heaven is.

137. It could then be inferred from the first order [n.135] that the heaven would be closer to God and thus more perfect than a fly; but from the second order [n.136] that a fly is more perfect than the heaven, and so opposite to it.

138. I reply, therefore, that whenever perfections, however disparate, come together in the first [perfect thing, n.134], that perfection is simply more perfect which is closer to the first according to what has the idea of the simply more perfect - just as, according to the Philosopher Topics 3.2.117b17-19, it does not follow that a monkey is better than a horse, although a monkey is more similar to a man, because it is not more similar to a man in the simply better conditions. Now in the first thing intellectuality is a nobler condition than necessity of existing, understanding the ‘more’ in the way in which the distinction there is drawn [n.134]; and therefore man is simply more noble than the heaven.

139. Nor yet should you wonder that a diverse order is assigned to the first thing according to diverse perfections, because any perfection can be the principle of one natural hierarchy or, according to the philosophers, of one ‘golden chain’ [Henry of Ghent, Dionysius the Areopagite]; and so according to diverse perfections simply in the first thing, participated by diverse things in ordered fashion, diverse golden chains can be noted.

140. To the issue in hand I say that there is in substance, as it is the first of beings, a double order of priority: one in ‘standing under’ [sub-stans] other things, which includes receiving other things and being perfected by them; another the order of intensive actuality; and this second perfection is simply nobler than the first and greater, because it first belongs to the potential [of substance], or at least requires that to which potential being belongs. Now quantity is closer to substance according to the first idea of order, because it is more immediate in the order of receptivity; but quality is closer in the second idea of order, for it is the principle of acting (quantity is not so), and in this respect it appears a greater being.

2. Second Opinion

a. Exposition of the Opinion.

141. The second opinion is at the other extreme, namely that no accident can be the subject of any accident, and consequently that any accident whatever in the Eucharist is without a subject.

142. In favor of this opinion are the reasons given above, at the beginning, for the first part of the question [nn.104-113].

b. Rejection of the Opinion

143. On the contrary:

That is per se the subject of any accident of which the accident is predicated per se in the second mode [n.73 footnote]; but of some accident is some accident predicated per se in the second mode, as the proper attribute of it;     therefore etc     .

Proof of the major: that of which an accident is predicated per se in the second mode falls in the definition of that accident as something added to it, and only added as subject, because the defined thing has on such a defining subject no other dependence.

The minor is plain because universally all the properties demonstrated in the whole of mathematical science are demonstrated of accidents, and are said of them per se in the second mode. The point is plain by beginning from the first conclusion to the last of arithmetic or geometry, to such an extent that, if there were no incorporeal substance in the universe, any knowable property would be as equally known of that of which it is known; for a triangle no less has three angles [sc. equal to two right angles] even if triangularity were not in any substance; and three lines would no less be able to be the sides of an equilateral triangle even if no substance were the subject for them.

144. Again, Avicenna Metaphysics 2.1 manifestly maintains that some accident is the subject of another accident, and he gives an example, as motion for instance is the subject of fast speed and slow speed.

145. And third the fact appears in the issue at hand, in the argument given for the opposite [n.114], because it is manifest here that there are many relations by which things are related, as equality, likeness, passive circumscription [sc. being circumscribed by place]; but these relations would not be able to be posited, nor able to be so in a subject, since absolutes cannot be related by these relations were these relations not formally in them.

B. Scotus’ own Opinion

146. I reply to the question, then, by mediating between the said opinions: for I make a distinction in ‘subject’: as it is taken for the ultimate term of the dependence of another per accidens act, or as it is taken for any proximate term (though not the ultimate term) of that dependence, that is, taken for anything to which some act could be present per accidens as the form of it, not making something per se one with the subject.

147. In the first way [n.146] it is plain that nothing can be the subject of an accident save substance. In the second way I say that it is possible for some accident to be the subject of an accident, as the arguments prove that were touched on against the second opinion [nn.143-145]. And it is possible for any accident to be absolute without a subject in each way, as the arguments prove that were brought against the first opinion [nn.126-132].

148. But it is not possible that a respective accident is without a subject in the second way, because it is not possible that there be a respect between two things without the respect being of something to something, and this not by reason of ‘accident’ but by reason of ‘respect’; now there cannot be a respect of something to something unless it is in that of which it is the respect; and so, if it is the respect of an accident, it will be in that accident as an accident in a subject. And so, as to what is possible, it is plain that an accident can be without a subject, and this when subject is taken in this way and that way [sc. taken as substance or as accident].

149. But what is the case in fact?

I say that a respective accident is here in a subject, speaking of subject in the second way, because the relation of it is to a term.

150. But as to absolute accidents [nn.25-26], those who think in diverse ways about quantity will respond in diverse ways:

For those who say quantity is an absolute essence other than the essence of bodily substance and quality, as the common opinion says [Ord. II d.3 nn.71-74], would say that quantity here is without a subject but not quality, rather that quality is in quantity [nn.115-119]. And for this view there is this probability, that quality in this way is extended (it is plain to sense); and it is not extended essentially, but only per accidens, without an extension that is intrinsic to quality, according to this opinion [Giles of Rome]. But everything extended per accidens either receives in itself the extension by which it is extended per accidens, or receives it in extension or in something extended; now quality does not receive extension in itself, according to this opinion; therefore it is only extended per accidens, because it is received in something extended; and with this agrees the remark in the Categories 6.5b7-8, “Whiteness is as large as the surface is.”

151. But those who would say that the quantity of bodily substance is not other than the essence of this sort of substance, and that the quantity of color is not other than the color [Ord. II d.3 nn.132-135, 148-154], would say that the quality here is not in quantity, but rather that the quantity that appears is the quantity of quality.

152. But about this dispute there is discussion in Ord. II d.3 nn.4-6.